

point the special conditions should bear on these

the establishment of contacts in the Black Sea, and the exact delimitation of the Russian frontier in Asia. The Western Powers are not authorized to go beyond these three conditions; and on the other hand, Russia, in giving her adherence to the Convention, then as she knew that those conditions would be approved by the Council, proved that she would be disposed to accept the necessary compromise to reach the negotiations to a satisfactory result.

A private letter from Brussels, dated on the 23rd ult., contains the following remarks on the question of the day:

The essence of the treaty, such as they have become, contains one word to which I have already referred, and which is the only one that will involve the sacrifice of the principle of the

understand—it is the neutralization of the Black Sea, and which forms the first article. It is not the novelty of the expression which alarms us, but the real sense that we ought to attach to it. What does neutrality mean in time of peace? It is evidently nonsense, or rather a contradiction. Can it be that we are to remain neutral in time of war? The fault committed with regard to Belgium, when it was asked whether Belgium should remain neutral in any war which might take place between the different nations of Europe? That treaty was undoubtedly made against Louis Philippe, and took from him his natural ally; but it is equally known that this sort of neutrality is only respected when a Power does not find it to its advantage to be so. It is not the neutrality of the Black Sea; it is not that of the Pacific Ocean.

be allowed to enter the Dardanelles, it is precisely what existed before the war. If by it is meant the convention made between Russia and Turkey under the guarantee of the other Powers, which provides that neither of those States shall have ships of war in the Black Sea, it cannot be termed a neutralization, even when it is so called, and meaning, it could be necessary to believe that every one of the Powers of Turkey could not make use of her marine, either to annoy the coasts of Russia, or succour her maritime provinces, should they be invaded by land armies, which would be absurd. If Russia wished to attack Germany, or, taking advantage of the little energy put forth by the German States, wished to excite them against France, France would then not have their aid, and she would be exposed to all the attacks of the British fleet.

We are, then, justified in demanding that the word "neutralization" shall be effaced; for on concluding peace it is absurd and dangerous to anticipate cases of war. The Western Powers have reserved to themselves the right, independently of the four articles, to require from Russia guarantees for the maintenance of peace. It is quite evident that these exigencies ought to be extremely moderate; but it is equally evident that no one can pronounce that to be exorbitant which is indispensable for the security of Europe—that is to say, the re-establishment of treaties of 1815, and such as they existed in 1830.

the province taken by Russia from Prussia, her ancient ally, had been constituted an independent kingdom, on the soil of which a Russian army should never place its foot. Now, what is the consequence of the present state of things? It is this—that Russian armies to the number of from 300,000 to 400,000 march into Poland, and they can in a few days march into Saxony, into Silesia, Brandenburg, and enter Berlin; that they can by a flank march invade the whole of Galicia, and reach Vienna in eight days, and that, thus masters of the whole of Germany, they can advance to the Rhine, and in less than one month invade France. It is then for the common advantage of Europe to demand the execution of the treaties which Russia has solemnly sworn to observe.

lishment of those remains, poor as they are, of Polish nationality. If Russia refuse, on the ground of the insurance of 1830, she can be answered that all should not be punished for one fault, and that all events that have been sufficiently explained.

THE NEWS IN SPAIN.

[Paris (Jan. 12). *Gazette* of London Times.]

The news of Russia having accepted unconditionally the propositions for peace was received by the Spanish government last night, and was communicated at once to our legation here, a chief of the Spanish Foreign Office being the bearer of it. Lord Howden had a large dinner and evening party, several members of the cabinet, and the king being present, and on the announcement of the Russian acceptance.

despatch to him his lordship immediately rose and announced it to the assembled guests. It has been the theme of general conversation to-day, having been published in the *Gazette*.

THE NEWS IN FRANCE.

The Paris correspondent of *Le Nord*, writing on January 22d, says that when Prince Jerome went to command the news of the Russian acceptance of the peace proposals to his daughter, the Princess Mathilde, that lady threw herself upon his neck, "weeping for joy;" also, that when the Emperor Napoleon read the despatch to the council of war, Admiral Lyons cried, "Sire, I don't exactly understand it; there must be some mistake!" Louis Na-

Polen smiled, and read it again. "I wish the English would do this among themselves," said the Duke of Cambridge, "and say that the mission at Paris was at an end, and that he had only to take leave of the Emperor and start that evening for London." Louis Napoleon insisted that his Grace should remain three or four days. As to Prince Napoleon, after the despatch was read, his Royal Highness's remark was, "Then Italy and Poland are sacrificed." The Emperor, for avert the lively differences had taken place, the council being presided by the Duke of Cambridge and Prince Napoleon, the former warmly resisting any project of the re-establishment of Polish independence.

[Paris. Jan. 25.] Correspondence of the London Times.]

From the telegraphic despatches received to-day

it might be inferred that the acceptance by Russia of the Austrian conditions of peace is hardly so "pure and simple," so unconditional, as was at first supposed. The Russian Minister at Vienna, in his despatch, expresses a hope that Russia will be enabled to consider for not having "arrested the work of conciliation by necessary negotiations." Again, a despatch from Berlin speaks of a circular from M. de Nessérode to M. Budberg, in which the Russian Minister explains to his agents "the motives for the acceptance of the propositions of Austria, and his views on the necessity of negotiations." The despatch remarks on this that "the hopes of peace have lost thereby a little of force;" and, lastly, the *Journal de St. Petersburg* "hopes that Europe will show itself grateful for the moderation exhibited by

"I am aware that it would be wrong to attach much importance or implicit credit to telegraphic messages containing mutilated sentences from the newspapers. But, if they are substantially correct, they would justify a suspicion that some attempt at trickery is meant, though I have no doubt that the French and English governments are fully prepared for all emergencies, and are carefully on the watch against treachery. I have not seen M. de Nesselrode's circular, but I think it is not difficult to state, without its help, the motives for the moderation of the Russian proposals. Russia has no interest in accept our conditions of peace because she cannot help herself. She has been driven to the verge of ruin by the war, and the fact is admitted by Rus-

hans themselves, who literally shed tears over the humiliation which has fallen on their country, and which she has no choice but to bear. Russia accepts peace simply because she cannot carry on the war, and because she hopes, with the help of her ally Germany, to make the best bargain she can under the circumstances. If the efforts that are now made to introduce that Power into the conference be successful, the shame will be as great as is the impudence which can advocate or justify such an intrusion.

A good deal of sentiment will, no doubt, be expended in favor of Russia, and much argument employed on the cruelty of humiliating so interesting a country. But the did not spare Russia from humiliation. State nor which her power was so formidable.

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dull; but, on receipt of a telegraphic despatch that the Czar had sent orders to General Gortchakoff to suspend hostilities, there was a rapid rally, which was confirmed and accelerated by a rumor that Lord Palmerston had actually signed an armistice at noon. Whether there was any foundation for this report or not, its effect shows equally with the vividness desired in this capital, and the reports from the departments all prove that it would not be less welcome there. At every point the news of Russia's acceptance of the ultimatum was received with enthusiastic views, and every demonstration of delight. Were the Emperor Alexander to sign a royal peace to-day, and bring it to Paris in his